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ABOUT THE SADC FUTURES 
PROJECT
In these highly uncertain and rapidly changing times, the SADC 
region, like many regions in Africa, remains fundamentally dependent 
on a resilient agricultural system and natural resource base. Climate 
change still poses the greatest threat to the agricultural system 
and therefore technical capacity is needed to address these future 
impacts and adapt plans, policies and programs. Taking into account 
alternative futures, the SADC Futures project has produced tailored 
supporting materials and documents as part of a wider approach for 
foresight training in the region. These documents and the associated 
foresight framework aim to equip users to practically apply the range 
of foresight tools and methods for innovative strategic planning and 
policy formulation for climate resilience. 
This SADC Futures Project is a joint initiative of the SADC Secretariat’s 
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) Directorate, the Centre 
for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern 
Africa (CCARDESA), the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) 
through the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture 
and Food Security (CCAFS) and German Development Cooperation 
facilitated through the SADC / Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH ‘Adaptation to Climate Change in Rural 
Areas’ program (ACCRA), funded by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
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Why is it happening?
Plan
What do we want to experience in the future? What 
might get in our way? What might we do to get there?
Prospection
What might happen that we have not thought about?
Reflection
What might we want to do differently?
Strategy
What will we do differently?
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Stakeholder engagement and participation 
Data, evidence, knowledge and creativity 
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For Enhanced Climate  
Resilience and Agriculture 
Policy Development in the 
SADC Region
To expand on the foresight and futures capacity building the project has produced a series of accompanying knowledge products and sources. The 
knowledge series mapped to the SADC Futures foresight framework is shown below.
ABOUT THE SADC FUTURES KNOWLEDGE SERIES
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This study aims to describe recent developments in 
the Southern African region by documenting a set 
of mega-trends defining social, economic, political 
and environmental conditions. It includes analysis of 
the recent past as well as projections of future trends. To 
the extent possible, the report is based on information from 
2010 to the present, except in some cases where more recent 
information was not available. The purpose of this analysis is 
to get a snapshot of current conditions in the Southern African 
region and the dynamics that generated them, to inform the 
design and implementation of investments to secure climate-
resilient agricultural livelihoods in the region.  
The study goes beyond simply tracing trends, however, and 
provides guidance on how the information can best be used 
in making plans for the future. The mega-trend analysis gives 
insights into forces that will shape the future but does not 
provide predictions of the future. Humans are typically very 
linear thinkers and tend to look at trends from the past and 
project them forwards into the future, and we often fall into 
the trap of thinking that the future is defined by what has 
happened in the past. There is considerable uncertainty over 
how several of these mega-trends will play out in the near 
future, with the possibility of major disruptions and changes 
on the horizon. This can be seen quite clearly in the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic which is still unfolding, and which is 
already disrupting expectations of future conditions. 
This uncertainty of future conditions greatly complicates 
decision-making today. To address this complication, the 
development of scenarios to identify a range of plausible 
futures is an important tool for decision-makers. In the final 
section of the report we give examples of recent scenario 
work in the region to illustrate how the analysis of mega-
trends and their uncertainties can be useful in strategic 
decision-making under uncertainty.




Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis of 
the 17 mega-trends. These are:
The Southern African region has tremendous resources and 
capacity to achieve climate-resilient agricultural livelihoods. 
Specifically, the region has:
Considerable endowments of natural resources;
Relatively high levels of per capital GDP for most 
countries;
Achieved high rates of economic growth in recent past;
Achieved nearly universal coverage of basic education;
Seen significant improvements in women’s 
empowerment;
High rates of urbanization;
Relatively low levels of distortions in regional trade;
Increasing levels of intra-regional trade; and
Good potential for developing renewable energy 
sources.
The region is facing tremendous challenges and has not yet 
effectively addressed them.  Specifically, the region has:
Very high numbers of people of extreme poverty, 
concentrated in rural areas and projected to increase;
The highest level of income inequality in Africa which is 
still rising;
Stagnating economic growth rates in most recent years;
Poor agricultural performance persisting over decades;
Major challenges arising from climate change in terms 
of water availability and distribution and areas adapted 
to agricultural production;
Relatively weak performance in regional integration; and
Low scores on institutional quality and forward-looking 
thinking of governments for most countries.
Greater regional integration is likely to be necessary to 
achieve climate-resilient agricultural livelihoods. Specific 
aspects are:
Expansion of regional trade in water is increasingly 
important due to differential effects of climate change 
on rainfall and water availability throughout the region. 
This will affect agricultural production, electricity supply 
and access to water for human consumption;  
Development of regional market can be key driver of 
industrialization;
Development of regional food production and expansion 
of regional food trade can enhance food security and 
reduce external debt;
Development of regional agricultural value chains can 
not only underpin increased regional food production 
and trade, but also enhance employment opportunities; 
and 
Expansion and improvement of regional infrastructure 
is essential to achieve other benefits of regional 
integration.
Population is expected to continue increasing up to 
2050, but at a lower rate than the recent past. Countries in 
the Southern African region will experience a large growth 
of the youth population during the same period. Rural 
population is expected to decline slightly in some of the 
countries, and increase in others.  
The region has the highest level of urbanization in sub-
Saharan Africa and is expected to remain so up to 2050. 
Increasing urbanization is due mostly to population growth 
in urban areas and reclassification of rural areas as urban 
as population densities increase. Rural-urban migration is 
less important as a driving force of urbanization.
Dietary trends in the Southern African region are 
bifurcated with higher income groups following the classic 
transition to higher levels of meat consumption and highly 
refined foods, while high rates of under- and malnutrition 
are found amongst the poor and in rural areas.   
The region is being squeezed by a double 
burden of health risks: for the poor health risks are 
driven by undernutrition and stunting, as well as high 
vulnerability to communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS 
and malaria. On the other hand, for those with higher 
incomes poor diets leading to obesity and growth of non-
communicable diseases is becoming a major issue.
There are high and persistent levels of extreme poverty 
with significantly higher levels in rural areas. The numbers 
of extreme poor are projected to increase up to 2040 in the 
region although the percentage of the population in poverty 
is expected to decrease. Low levels of economic growth 
and high levels of inequality in access to key productive 
assets inhibit successful and broad poverty reduction. 
Most countries in the region have inherited colonial 
legacies of unequal land distribution and are seeking ways 
to reform them. The systems of land tenure are diverse 
across the region but customary systems are important for 
most. Common needs for land tenure systems are more 
transparency and systems that allow greater access and 
security of women to land.    
At present the region is witnessing growth in medium-
sized farms owned by urban and rural elites, as is the case 
in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In the small farm sector 
there is a high and increasing degree of fragmentation.   
Women have significantly less access to productive assets 
and education. However, considerable progress has been 
made in women’s political participation and representation 
and also in some countries in increasing education levels of 
women. 
The Southern African region is characterized by low levels 
of energy access, particularly in rural areas. Planned 
expansion of energy infrastructure is mostly aimed at 
industrialization and urban areas.  Hydropower is an important 
component of the energy supply and is likely to be affected 
by climate change. Energy demand is projected to grow 
rapidly up to 2050 due to expansion in the industrial sector 
with potential for major expansion from decentralized and 
renewable sources, particularly wind and solar.
The Southern African region had the lowest levels of 
economic growth in Africa in 2017 and 2018, after several 
years of having the highest levels of growth. Projections of 
growth have been significantly reduced due to expected 
impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic.  
The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is 
generally quite low across all countries in the Southern African 
region, but its share in employment is generally highest 
amongst sectors. Youth unemployment is a significant 
problem across all countries in the region. Food prices 
have increased in the region as have food imports, despite 
expansion of food production in the region. 
Land degradation is a major problem in virtually all 
countries in the Southern African region, and is a major 
contributor to the low agricultural productivity in the 
region. Contributory factors include poor soils, land fallows 
that are reducing or being eliminated with population 
pressures, and nutrient mining due to lack of attention to 
soil management and very limited use of inputs that could 
conserve and restore soil quality.
Water scarcity in the southern part of the Southern 
African region is expected to worsen with climate change 
and threatens not only agricultural production, which is 
largely rainfed, but also economic development where 
hydropower plays an important role. The northern 
countries of the region have abundant water supplies and 
thus regional management is important but not yet fully 
operational. 
The Southern African region is characterized by low or 
even negative productivity growth in agriculture, 
with most of the growth obtained through agricultural land 
expansion rather than more efficient use of agricultural 
inputs. At present the most productive agricultural lands 
are relatively small areas of irrigated land in the arid south. 
The northern areas have greater potential for expansion 
of agricultural activities. In recent years, middle income 
countries have generally done better than low income 
countries in achieving both land and labour productivity 
growth for crops and overall productivity for livestock 
production. Post-harvest losses in the region as a whole 
are over 30%.
The Southern African region is one of the most stable 
politically in Africa, albeit cases of political strife and 
even armed conflict have occurred recently in the 
region. The level of regional integration is complicated by 
the overwhelming strength of the South African economy 
compared with other countries in the region. The weakest 
aspects of regional integration are infrastructural (including 
water management and electricity). Successful coordination 
in managing water is essential to achieving the region’s 
development goals but has not yet been attained.
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Specific highlights from the 
megatrend analysis indicate that:
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Introduction: The 
Role of Events in 
Shaping the Future
This document provides a summary of mega-trends relevant to consider in the 
context of building plans and investments to support climate-resilient livelihoods in the 
Southern African region. These mega-trends are associated with driving appreciable 
change, whether through attitudinal, behavioural, economic or environmental 
mechanisms. The trends identified as “mega” depend to an extent on the context 
and institution describing them. For example, PwC1 describe five: urbanisation, climate 
change and resource security, shifting global power, demographic and social change, 
and technology, whereas the UN2 adds poverty and inequality, shocks and crises (as 
well as development finance) to their list. This report provides a synthesis of 15 mega-
trends most relevant for the regional context, covering social, economic, technology, 
environmental and political processes.
While reviewing these results, it is important to keep in mind how they should be 
interpreted in the context of building climate-resilient livelihoods in the Southern African 
region. The mega-trend analysis gives insights into forces that will shape 
the future but does not provide predictions of the future. Humans are typically very 
linear thinkers and tend to look at trends from the past and project them forwards into 
the future, and we often fall into the trap of thinking that the future is defined by what has 
happened in the past. However, as 2020 has already shown, the future is not a simple 
linear extrapolation of trends, unfolding in a constant and gradual way. Instead, “events 
happen” and sometimes these events are both highly impactful and disruptive.  
Such events can arise for two main reasons. Firstly, “black swan” events are rare, but 
with very high impact; perhaps both unexpected and unprecedented. The COVID-19 
pandemic is arguably such an event. Secondly, a single event (a hazard) or multiple 
hazards, can occur, and alone or together can create chains of interacting effects that 
cascade across borders. For example, the food price shocks of 2007-8 and 2010-
12 created ripple effects that impacted across the world and arose from relatively 
minor climate events interacting with other policy areas (biofuel policy), and a lack of 
transparency of stocks, leading to an over-amplification of market dynamics. In extremes, 
“risk cascades” or “black swan” events can create systemic risks (Challinor et 
al. 2018; Homer-Dixon et al. 2015) that have the potential to re-shape economies and 
societies.
1 https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends.html (Last accessed: 7 August 2020) 2 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/
home/librarypage/sustainable-development-goals/global-trends--challenges-and-opportunities-in-the-implementatio.html (Last 
accessed: 7 August 2020)
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As time goes on, our economic systems are growing in fragility 
(Homer-Dixon et al. 2015). To illustrate, take food security—
consistent and reliable access to nutritious food—which is 
typically supplied through a combination of local production, and 
regional and global trade. The latter has become more important 
with growing market integration across borders, creating 
increasing dependencies on imports and exports.  Agriculture 
depends on water, land, supply of labour and in many parts of 
the world, also chemicals and energy. Increasingly, agriculture 
is also reliant on more advanced technologies like satellite 
navigation in precision agriculture and transport networks. The 
drive for economic efficiency also leads to a greater reliance on 
just-in-time supplies. Food availability therefore relies on a range 
of sectors, infrastructure, complex logistics, finance, and so on, 
domestically, regionally and globally to work in concert in order 
to supply a nation’s requirements. The just-in-time nature and 
sectorial co-dependencies of many food systems mean that any 
shock (which could be a climate change impact, a change in 
energy policy, a geo-political disruption) can rapidly propagate 
around the world. 
Proportionally, the impacts of such events are often felt most 
strongly by those with the lowest levels of wealth and economic 
resiliency.  
Perhaps most importantly, the spatial and sectoral co-
integration of many human systems means that there is a very 
large combination of potential shocks, places they could happen, 
and pathways through which they could propagate to create 
significant impacts (Challinor et al. 2018). Thus, whilst we often 
think of “black swans”, the number of potential ways that risks 
can cascade to affect any given country is very large. As such, 
we should regard events like the global financial crisis, food 
price spikes, insurgency, pest and disease outbreaks, impactful 
climate change, crises deriving from movement of people to all 
be elements of “the new normal”.  Each event may be a “one-
off”, but in any given period, we should expect something big to 
happen.
Our linear-thinking pre-disposes us to think of the future in terms 
of “business-as-usual” scenarios. But as outlined, the world 
is highly non-linear, stochastic and complex. Given enough 
shocks, our expectant realities of locked-in, resilient-to-change 
“business-as-usual” futures may be reconfigured.
In the following sections of this document we describe 
15 mega-trends covering social, economic, technological, 
environmental, governance categories. Climate change is not 
considered here since a more detailed analysis of this mega-trend 
in the Southern African region is covered in a separate report.  The 
analysis is based on data and reports from 2010 to present, with 
time horizons up to 2050.  The analysis utilizes material from beyond 
the southern African region, as in some cases information was only 
available at the country or sub-Saharan Africa level. In addition, 
the countries included in the Southern African category varied 
considerably by source and over the last 10 years. For this reason, 
the countries included in each of the regional-level analyses are 
identified. 
We conclude the report with a discussion of future uncertainty in the 
drivers, and the utility of scenario analyses for decision making under 
uncertainty, giving some recent examples of their use in Southern Africa 
to examine the future of food systems.
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Quoting from United States Global 
Strategic Trends 2035 (NIC 2017):    
“Examining the trends…. makes vivid that the world 
will become more volatile in the years ahead. States, 
institutions, and societies will be under pressure from 
above and below the level of the nation-state to adapt 
to systemic challenges—and to act sooner rather than 
later. From above, climate change, technology standards 
and protocols, and transnational terrorism will require 
multilateral cooperation. From below, the inability of 
government to meet the expectations of their citizens, 
inequality, and identity politics will increase the risk of 
instability.”
02Mega-trends in the Southern African region 
SOCIAL TRENDS
Demographics
Population rising but at decreasing rate, bulge in youth population up 
to 2050. Actual level of growth uncertain.
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is expected to experience the highest rate of population 
growth globally in the coming decades, although there is considerable range in the 
level of projected increase, depending particularly on changes in total fertility rate. 
More recent projections are generally lower than previous ones, from an estimate of 4 
billion people from the UN world population projection of 2014, to 1.58 billion from a 
recent Lancet study (Vollset et al. 2020). The increase could be between 50% to 300% 
per depending on the scenario used.  
Projections for the Southern African region indicate population increasing at a 
decreasing rate arriving at a total of over 80 million by 2050. The population in rural 
areas is expected to decline slightly to just under 20 million by 2050. 
In 2018, the estimated population of the Southern African region was 
345.2 million (SADC 2018). The largest population share in the region 
in 2018 was in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (26.6%) 
followed by South Africa (16.7%) and Tanzania (15.7%) (SADC 2018). 
In the region, overall, there has been a downward trend in mortality, 
particularly infant and child mortality. The combination of high fertility 
and declining mortality has been largely responsible for the rapidly 
increasing population of the region.
Figure 2 shows projections of the per cent of population aged 15-
64 years—e.g., the projection of the size of the labour force for the 
Southern African region. As can be seen, the median projection 
indicates high increases up to 2040 with a gradual decline thereafter. 
Although there is some uncertainty in the level of growth, there is 
clearly an expansion of youth into the labour force in the next 10 to 
20 years.
3 In this context, the Southern African region includes Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 4 Author’s download of data from: https://population.un.org/wpp/ 5 Author’s download of data from: https://population.un.org/wpp/
Figure 1. Total and Rural Population Projections to 2050 Southern African Region  
Source: UN World Population Prospects4
Figure 2. Percentage of population aged 15-64 years in the Southern 





Urbanization rates are highest in the 
Southern African region compared with rest 
of Africa, mostly from population growth in 
urban areas and reclassification of rural areas 
as urban as population densities increase.
Africa’s urban population is projected to expand around 
three-fold from 360 million in 2015 to 1,137 million by 
2050 (Jayne et al. 2017).  Around 55% of the continent’s 
population will live in urban areas by the middle of the 
century (Cleland and Machiyama 2016).  Most of this 
growth is from urban population growth rather than 
migration, or areas that were previously considered 
rural being reclassified as urban as population densities 
increased (Jayne et al. 2017). This is consistent with 
findings that a large share of Africa’s urban population 
is now residing in secondary and tertiary towns, 
which tend to have close links with economic activity 
in surrounding rural areas. Farming and agri-food 
systems are therefore likely to play a significant role in 
employment growth in these urban areas.
In the Southern African region, the overall trend has 
been towards increasing urbanization of the population 
in most countries with the exception of Mauritius 
and Eswatini which exhibit de-urbanizing trends. The 
percentage of urban population in Mauritius decreased 
from about 44.0% in 2000 to 42.8% in 2011; while, in 
Eswatini the proportion of urban population declined 
from 23.1% in 1997 to 22.1% in 2007 (SADC 2013a). 
In other areas of the region, urban population growth 
rates are higher than national totals. In contrast to the 
situation in other areas of sub-Saharan Africa, in-
migration to urban areas is a major source of urban 
population growth in the Southern African region (SADC 
2013a).
Figure 3 shows projected urbanization rates for the UN 
designated Southern African region.  It indicates that 
the level of population living in urban areas is higher in 
the region compared with all other African regions, and 
it is projected to remain so up to 2050.
Urban and higher income groups are likely to transition to highly 
refined food high in calories and fat while for rural and poor groups 
high levels of food insecurity and nutritional deficits will remain.
The typical diet of Southern African consumers has been changing over recent years, 
in response to driving forces of urbanization and income growth. The trend in dietary 
changes follow the general trend outlined by Popkin (2003), where the nutrition transition 
develops over time with five fairly distinct phases, with most countries between 
phases 3 and 5. The general trend is the abandonment of wholesome traditional and 
predominately plant-based diets at stage 3 to highly refined food typically high in energy, 
As is evident in the figure above from Nnyepi et al. (2015), overall levels of 
consumption of edible oils is generally high and increasing over the period 
1992-2007.  
saturated fats, salt and simple sugars/caloric sweeteners at stage 4. 
Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and South Africa are believed to be moving rapidly 
from stage 3 to stage 4 of the nutrition transition, although in some countries there 
are intra-country differences (Nnyepi et al. 2015). The dietary transition is analysed 
via consumption of edible oils, sugar and sweeteners to demonstrate dietary 
shifts from wholesome traditional foods for these countries in Southern Africa. 
These foods were selected in part because they provide significant energy but are 
largely devoid of other nutrients.
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Figure 3. Urbanization rates 1950-2050: All African regions. Source: UN World 
Population Prospects6
Figure 4. Evidence of nutrition transition in Southern Africa (1). Vegetable oil 
consumption trends in Southern African countries, 1992-2007. Source: Nnyepi et 
al. 2015
6 Author’s download of data from: https://population.un.org/wup/DataQuery/
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Figure 5. Evidence of nutrition transition in Southern Africa (2). Sugar and 
sweeteners consumption trends in Southern African countries, 1992-2007. 
Source: Nnyepi et al. 2015
Figure 6. Prevalence of global acute malnutrition (left) and stunting (right) amongst children under 5: SADC region. Source: SADC 2020b
As displayed, Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland have the highest sugar/
sweetener consumption in the region, ranging from 80 to 108 g/person daily. 
Namibia and South Africa registered a decline in per capita consumption of sugar 
during this period. Within countries, urban populations, school children, high 
socio-economic status groups and elderly are found to have the highest sugar 
consumption levels (Nnyepi et al. 2015).
In Zambia, urban lifestyles and growing affluence in cities are driving a change in 
and diversification of diets, with the share of food expenditure devoted to maize 
decreasing significantly in recent years for both rural and urban households 
(GCRF-AFRICAP 2018). For poor households typically in rural areas, relative 
expenditure on vegetables has increased but remains low; among wealthier 
households, expenditure on wheat, rice, potatoes and animal proteins has 
increased along with the consumption of foods that are high in fat and salt. For 
low income households approximately half of dietary energy comes from maize 
and the consumption of nutrient-poor foods—and micronutrient deficiencies are 
common.
Whilst the dietary transition has followed a common pattern in recent decades, 
the twin imperatives of mitigating environmental change (particularly climate 
change) and improving public health, signal the necessity of transforming diets 
towards healthier, more sustainable eating patterns. 7Historical trends may 
therefore not predict future changes, given the costs of past trends are now better 
understood (see below).
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7 E.g., the two recent Lancet Commissions: (1) Willett W et al. 2019. Food in the Anthropocene: the EAT-Lancet Commission on healthy diets from sustainable food systems. The Lancet 393(10170):447-492. (2) Swinburn BA et al. 2020. The Global Syndemic of Obesity, Undernutrition, and Climate Change: The Lancet Commission report. The 
Lancet 393(10173):791-846. The IPCC’s Special Report on Climate Change and Land (2019) https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl also argues for dietary change. 8 SADC is an organization founded and maintained by countries in Southern Africa. It aims to further socio-economic, political and security cooperation among its Member States and foster regional 
integration in order to achieve peace, stability and wealth. The Member States of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Union of the Comoros Islands, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Health and food security
The Southern African region is being squeezed by double 
burden of health risks: on the one hand undernutrition and 
stunting, as well as high vulnerability to communicable 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, on the other 
hand poor diets leading to obesity and growth of non-
communicable diseases.
According to the 2019 Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis 
(RVAA) for the Southern African region, an estimated 41.2 million people 
in 13 Member States of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)8 were food insecure in 2019. This was a 28% increase in food 
insecurity over 2018 for 11 of the SADC countries that reported in both 
years. Significant increases in the number of people who are food-
insecure have been recorded in Zambia (144%), Zimbabwe (128%), 
Eswatini (90%), Mozambique (85%) and DRC (80%). 
The prevalence of wasting (e.g., low weight-for-age) amongst children 
under age 5 is above 5% in 7 SADC countries, with some areas above 
10%. Stunting prevalence (e.g., low height-for-age) is over 30% in 10 
of the SADC countries The graphic below shows the distribution of 
wasting and stunting (low height-for-age) amongst children across the 
SADC countries from the latest SADC food security update in April 2020 
(SADC 2020b). It is expected that COVID-19 will further exacerbate food 
insecurity in the region in 2020 and into 2021. 
Photo: CGIAR
The Southern African region has been hit hard by the HIV/AIDS epidemic—accounting for one third of total global cases. 9Eight of the SADC countries are 
amongst those with the highest incidence of tuberculosis globally, and 75% of the SADC population is at risk of contracting malaria). However, projections 
indicate a declining rate of mortality from all communicable diseases up to 2030 as shown in the graphic below (Cilliers et al. 2011), though of course this may 
change in the light of emerging infectious diseases, such as COVID-19.
Figure 7. Communicable disease mortality by subtype for Southern Africa: 2010 and 2030 Source: Cilliers et al. 2011
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The Southern African region is facing a growing “double burden” of poor 
nutrition, with obesity and associated health risks growing amongst 
several countries. One the main factors is poor diets—as discussed in 
the section on dietary transitions, as well as lack of physical activity. 
The graphic below from Nnyepi et al 2015 shows the distribution of 
risk factors for non-communicable diseases associated with diet and 
physical activity (PA) for 10 of the Southern African countries. 
Figure 8. Prevalence of risk factors for non-communicable diseases 
in Southern African countries. Source: Nnyepi et al. 2015
9 https://www.sadc.int/themes/health/communicable-diseases/ (Last accessed: 7 August 2020)
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Poverty and inequality
High and increasing rates of extreme poverty characterize the Southern African region, associated 
with low economic growth and agricultural productivity, as well as very high rates of inequality and 
low scores on most social indicators.
Poverty is a large and persistent problem in the Southern African region as it is for all of Africa. Although poverty rates have 
declined over recent decades in Africa, the absolute number of poor people has increased (Badiane and Collins 2016). 
The Africa SDG 2019 report shows that for most Southern African countries meeting SDG1 on ending poverty remains a 
significant challenge. 
According to the analysis in the Africa SDG 2019 report, while the Southern African region is not on track to meet any 
of the SDGs, there is moderate progress on 7 of the 15 goals and in no case is there a worsening of performance. The 
conclusion is that Southern Africa is performing better than any other region of sub-Saharan Africa (SDG Center for Africa 
and Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2019).
The Southern African region has a heavy burden of extreme poverty (measured as living on less than USD 1.90/day). It is 
estimated that nearly 88 million people (45% of the population) live in extreme poverty across the region. Southern Africa 
accounts for 9% of extreme poverty globally, even though it only accounts for about 2.5% of the world 
population (Porter 2017).
Poverty has a strong rural bias in sub-Saharan Africa as can be seen from the figure below from the IFAD 
2016 Rural Development Report. The percentage headcount of people in extreme poverty is significantly 
higher in rural areas than urban ones, although a slight decline in the relationship is shown for East and 
Southern Africa over the period 1990-2010 (IFAD 2016).
As with the overall trend in Africa, the Southern African region10 is expected to see a drop in the 
percentage of the population living in extreme poverty from 45% in 2017 to 41% by 2040 (Porter 2017).  
However, the absolute numbers of people living in extreme poverty are expected to increase to nearly 
130 million— an addition of 40 million people to those in extreme poverty in 2017 (see figure 11). The 
reason is high population growth, high inequality and slow growth in the agricultural sector which most 
poor people rely on for their livelihoods. 
Figure 9. Southern Africa SDG Dashboard. Source: SDG Center for Africa and Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2019
Figure 10. Trends in rural and urban poverty in East, Southern, West and Central Africa (1990-2010). 
Source: IFAD 2016
10 Includes the 14 SADC countries shown in Figure 12
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Southern Africa has the highest level of inequality (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient) of any region in the world and with current trends the level of 
inequality is expected to increase slightly over time.  These are pre-COVID 
estimates and thus are likely to be higher in the post COVID era.
According to Porter 2017, the projected increases in the number of 
poor is especially high in Madagascar, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Mozambique, South Africa and Angola will still have high numbers of poor 
people but with relatively small increases over today’s levels. The results of 
the ISS analysis are shown in the figure below.
The Southern African region has not experienced growth that 
is sufficiently inclusive or high to provide for improvements in 
livelihoods of the poor in the region. The region as a whole is 
expected to average 3.5% annual growth to 2040, which is lower 
than every other region on the continent except for Central Africa. 
Meanwhile, population growth is expected to average 2% over 
the same time period (Porter 2017). Note this estimate does 
not include the impacts of COVID-19 which can be expected to 
exacerbate poverty.
The Southern African region is one of the most unequal in terms 
of income and social indicators as indicated in the figure on 
the SDG Dashboard showing significant or major challenges in 
achieving SDG 10 on reducing inequality for all but 2 countries. 
The table below from the 2020 Southern Africa economic outlook 
report shows medium to high levels of inequality (e.g., high Gini 
coefficients) for 8 of the 14 Southern African countries included.
Figure 11. Extreme poverty forecast for Southern Africa (per cent of 
population and number of people), 2015 to 2040. Source: Porter 2017
Table 1. Analysis of inequality by country. Source: AfDB 2020
Figure 12. Extreme poverty forecast for Southern Africa (per cent of 






Very High Gini >0.60 South Africa
High Gini 0.53-0.5999 Mozambique, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana
Medium Gini 0.45-0.529 Malawi, Eswatini, Lesotho
Low Gini 0.40-0.449 Madagascar, Angola, Zimbabwe
Very Low Gini <0.399 Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe
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Southern African countries score fairly low on the Human Development Index (HDI), with only two countries (Mauritius 
and Botswana) in the top 100. Eswatini has the highest growth in the HDI index from 2010 to 2018. Namibia and Lesotho 
are the only countries where the HDI index for women was higher than that of men. The picture of human development 
in the region shifts considerably however, when adjusted for inequality. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa have fairly 
high HDI scores, but also high levels of inequality, indicating that access to productive resources are limited to a minority 
(AfDB 2020).
HDI Inequality Adjusted HDI (IHDI) HDI by gender




2018 IHDI Female Male
Mauritius 0.796 66 0.8 0.688 0.782 0.803
Botswana 0.728 94 1.2 - 0.723 0.731
South Africa 0.705 111 0.8 0.463 0.698 0.710
Namibia 0.645 130 1.2 0.417 0.647 0.641
Sao Tome & Principe 0.609 137 1.4 0.507 0.571 0.635
Eswatini 0.608 138 2.2 0.430 0.595 0.618
Zambia 0.591 143 1.4 0.394 0.575 0.606
Angola 0.574 149 1.5 0.392 0.546 0.605
Zimbabwe 0.563 150 0.9 0.435 0.540 0.584
Madagascar 0.521 162 0.4 0.386 0.504 0.533
Lesotho 0.518 164 1.5 0.350 0.522 0.509
Malawi 0.485 172 1.3 0.346 0.466 0.501
Mozambique 0.446 180 1.5 0.309 0.422 0.468
World 0.731 - 0.6 0.584 0.707 0.751
SSA 0.541 - 1.03 0.376 0.507 0.569
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Table 2. Human Development Index, by gender, by country, 2018. Source: AfDB 2020 Figure 13. Global distribution of nutrient production by farm size. Source: Herrero et al. 2017
Land distribution
There is a growth trend in medium sized farms owned by urban and rural elites in 
countries. This could represent a potential source of wage income in the future. Overall, 
there is a high degree of fragmentation in agricultural land holdings and decreasing farm 
size for smallholders. There exist highly diverse systems of land tenure across Southern 
African countries but customary systems are important in all but one country. Tenure 
regimes that deny access to women are a problem throughout the region. 
The proportion of farm sizes that are small or very small in sub-Saharan Africa is higher than in many regions of 
the world (see Figure 13). Around 80% of all nutrients come from farms that are <20ha in size.  
Photo: Neil Palmer (CIAT)
Farmland distribution patterns in sub-Saharan Africa are 
changing rapidly, with a significant increase in demand for 
agricultural land from international and national firms, as well as 
urban-based African investors (Jayne et al. 2017).
Rural population growth has also contributed to the increasing 
subdivision of land and fragmentation into tiny plots. Although 
farms of fewer than five hectares still account for about 90% of 
all farms in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of these farms is 
increasing only gradually in most African countries owing to land 
pressures, the economic unviability of further sub-dividing very 
small farms, and youth migration (Jayne et al. 2016). Conversely, 
the number of farms of 5-100 hectares (medium-scale farms) 
is rising rapidly. An increasing proportion of agricultural land is 
controlled by medium- and large-scale farms owned by urban-
based Africans, who have acquired farmland using income 
earned from non-farm sources. 
The displacement of small farmers to marginal production 
areas or out of agriculture due to large- and medium-sized land 
acquisitions is a major concern in rural areas of sub-Saharan 
Africa (Barbier and Hochard 2018). Land acquisition is done 
predominantly through negotiations with customary authorities 
who still hold title to much of the agricultural land, as well as 
through purchase, where it is legal (Sitko and Jayne 2014; Jayne 
et al. 2016). Recent analysis indicates that medium-scale farms 
of between 5-100 hectares control between 30% and 50% of 
total farmland in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia (Jayne et 
al. 2016). Estimates from survey data in 6 sub-Saharan African 
countries indicates that urban households control between 25% 
and 35% of total agricultural land, and that these shares have 
risen rapidly in a short period (Jayne et al. 2016).
If current trends continue, we can expect that there will be fewer 
small-scale family farms and greater levels of wage employment 
on medium- and large-scale farms. We can expect that youth 
will face increased challenges in accessing land- particularly in 
areas of favourable access to markets (Jayne et al. 2017).
Southern African countries exhibit the same trends as those 
at the sub-Saharan African level, albeit with considerable 
differences between countries in terms of land tenure systems. 
Table 3 shows an increasing level of fragmentation of farm 
sizes for 11 Southern African countries from 1980 to 1990 
(Moyo 2014).
In the Southern African region land is generally vested in the state, although 
often used by people under customary law (SADC 2010). Ongoing land policy 
development trends in the region give greater recognition to customary tenure 
systems. The history of colonial and racial discrimination in Southern Africa has left 
a deep mark on land issues in the region. Today, large-scale commercial farming 
is dominated by white elites and foreign landowners while small-scale farming is 
predominately black. Discrimination against women for land tenure is widespread 
(SADC 2010).
Land reform policies differ across the various Southern African countries. Countries 
such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have all taken somewhat unique 
approaches to land administration and land reform. South Africa predominantly 
provides for freehold and some communal land rights (mainly rural), whilst Zimbabwe 
provides a mixed system of freehold and leasehold land rights, and Mozambique is 
slowly transitioning from a predominantly leasehold system towards freehold land 
rights (PESA 2018).
In the Southern African region land reform progress has generally 
been slow, with poor implementation and high uncertainty about future 
developments. Problems have arisen from lack of adequate budget 
allocations, limited post-settlement support for the beneficiaries and 
smallholder farmers, and lack of technical support (PESA 2018). 
Consequently, large-scale commercial farming remains mostly owned by 
colonial settlers who monopolised large tracts of fertile and productive 
land, sometimes benefiting from state subsidies, and maintaining their 
competitive advantage over indigenous smallholder farmers (PESA 2018).
Analysis of the land ownership situation in Zambia from GCRF-AFRICAP’s 
work indicates that trends similar to those found at sub-Saharan Africa 
level are occurring in the Southern African region. In Zambia, reforms to 
land ownership, through the Land Conversion of Titles Act 1975 and the 
Lands Act of 1995, paved the way for greater investment in agricultural 
land by both domestic and foreign investors. The country has seen large 
scale investments in sugarcane and soybean production supported 
by government investments in electrification and food processing 
infrastructure. However, acquisitions of large farms accounts for only 
1.6% of Zambia’s agricultural land. A recent study estimates that 50% of 
Zambian agricultural land is owned by medium-scale land owners, often 
wealthy and politically influential urban dwellers (Jayne et al. 2016). The 
country has a dual system of customary tenure and formal title registration, 
and there is much political controversy surrounding the relative powers of 
chiefs and the state to allocate and administer land. Recent attempts at 
limiting the autonomy of chiefs in land allocation through the new National 
Land Policy have met with resistance. At the same time, local land users 
are often found to be excluded from land acquisition processes (Nolte et 
al. 2014). 
Madagascar has taken a different approach than others in the region. In 
2005 the government of Madagascar launched a massive reform aimed 
at decentralizing land management and legally recognizing the property 
rights of “de facto” occupants. The stated objective was to “meet the 
massive demand for land tenure security, in a timely manner and at a cost 
appropriate to the economic context, by formalizing unwritten laws and 
upholding written laws.” The Malagasy government expected to secure 
500,000 plots with this approach. The program has been relatively slow 
in implementation, however. More than 31,000 property certificates were 
delivered in 2018 with a further 60,000 pending requests for property 
certificates expected to have been resolved by early 2019 (AFD 2019).
A summary of the types of land tenure in fifteen countries of Southern 
Africa is shown in the table on the following page.





1980 1990 2000 2009 2009 2009
Angola 0.5 66 0.28 0.2 0.2 1.0
Botswana 1.5 1.06 0.70 0.1 0.1 0.5
Lesotho 0.2 0.18 0.12 0.2 0.2 1.0
Malawi 0.4 0.28 0.36 0.2 0.3 1.0
Mozambique 0.3 0.20 0.21 0.2 0.2 1.0
Namibia - - - 0.4 0.4 2.0
South Africa - - - 0.3 0.3 1.5
Swaziland 0.3 0.21 0.14 0.2 0.2 1.0
Tanzania 0.3 0.19 0.18 0.2 0.3 1.5
Zambia 0.9 0.62 0.21 0.3 0.3 1.5
Zimbabwe 0.4 0.29 - 0.3 0.3 1.5
Table 3. Per capita landholdings in Southern African countries. Source: Moyo 2014
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Gender issues
Gender inequality with women having less political, social 
and economic power than men has been, and continues to be, 
a major problem in the region, however, some improvements 
have been achieved with participation in political 
representation and schooling for females.
According to the 2019 SDG Gender Index, sub-Saharan Africa has an 
average regional index score of 51.1—the lowest scoring region globally in 
terms of gender equality (SADC 2019a).
The Southern African region exhibits several aspects of gender disparities 
in terms of political, social, economic and health status. These include 
lower schooling rates for females particularly in rural areas and early age 
of pregnancy and marriage, maternal mortality rates and prevalence of HIV 
infections. For example:
Gender inequality exists in almost all spheres of life in 
Eswatini: socially, women are regarded as minors; decision-making 
power is vested in males at family, community and national levels; men 
take decision on matters relating to sexuality, reproduction, family size, 
and the adoption of fertility regulation measures (SADC 2013a).  
Information on status and trends regarding gender issues 
in Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa are 
scant; however, in Botswana, the customary law and practice have 
been observed as inhibiting the success of efforts (including government 
policies, legal instruments and programs) to eliminate gender 
discrimination by continuing the perpetuation of unequal power relations 
between men and women (SADC 2013a).
However, many Southern African countries have taken the implementation of 
the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development (1997) and its addendum 
on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children 
(1998), and the achievement of the Millenium Development Goal (MDG) 
targets related to gender seriously in their planning and implementation 
strategies, particularly primary school enrolment.  
Representation of women in the decision-making spheres of governance has 
been on the increase in almost all countries in SADC region, and the most 
recent data show that South Africa is a leader in this, with about 45% of 
women representatives in the Parliament, followed by Mozambique (39%), 
Angola (38.6%) and Tanzania (36%) (SADC 2013a).






Angola2 124,670,00 30,809,760 - - Approx. 85-90%
Botswana 58,200,000 2,254,130 25% 4% 71%




1,736,400 1,136,190 19% 25% 56%
Lesotho 3,035,500 2,108,130 5% 5% 90%
Madagascar3 58,704,100 26,262,370 45% 15% 40%
Malawi 9,400,000 18,143,310 22% 12% 66%
Mauritius 204,000 1,265,300 - 80% -
Mozambique 80,159,000 29,495,96 7% - 93%
Namibia 82,400,000 2,448,260 20% 44% 36%
Seychelles4 45,000 96,760 Over 60% - -
South Africa 122,103,700 57,779,620 14% 72% 14%
Tanzania 94,508,700 56,318,350 15% 1.50% 84%
Zambia 75,261,400 17,351,820 30% 6% (Leasehold) 64%
Zimbabwe 39,100,000 14,439,020 16% 0.376 42%
1 2018 population estimates (World Bank)
2 Land tenure in Angola and DRC are not known, as reliable data has not been collected and land reform to date has 
largely failed. For both countries, the majority of citizens are said to exist on land that has been passed down though 
families or falls under customary, local rules. For example, an estimated 85-90% of Angolans hold their land without any 
recognised rights under formal law. In both countries, technically, the government controls majority of land. In the case 
of Angola, Cain (2013) notes that legislators have historically and in the present demonstrated a tendency to contain or 
circumscribe the land rights of the country’s rural and poor peri-urban populations.
3 Madagascar went through land reform in 2005, with the goal of converting most land to titled private property, including 
communally managed lands. However, only 10-15% is estimated to have successfully been titled in subsequent years.
4 Actual percentage no available, but at least 60% of land is protected for environmental reasons according to FAO.
Source: Amended from SADC (2010)
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Table 4. Types of land tenure in Southern Africa. Source: Ransom et al. 2019
Education and skills development
Southern Africa has made significant progress in achieving universal access to primary school education with over 
80% of school-aged children enrolled. This is significantly higher than the sub-Saharan African average of 70% (AfDB 
2020). However, drop-out rates are over 10% in most countries. Secondary and tertiary school enrolment levels are 
low; at 50% in lower secondary, 30% in upper secondary and under 15% in tertiary for most countries. The figure 
below shows the distribution of tertiary school enrolment of Southern African countries by gender for 2017. Overall 
the rates of enrolment are quite low, however, in several countries (Angola, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Zambia and Zimbabwe) female enrolment is equal or higher than male enrolment.
Most Southern African countries are expected to have a significant increase in the workforce, however, there 
is skills gap of the future workforce in meeting employment demands. Southern Africa has very poor scores on 
the Human Capital Index (HCI) which measures levels of health and education as shown in the figure below. The 
index ranges from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates maximum potential being met. All countries except Mauritius have a 
score below .5. Angola, Lesotho, Madagascar and Mozambique score under .4. The HCI is calculated for 157 
countries, and as can be seen in the figure the Southern African countries are amongst the lowest ranked. 
Figure 14. Tertiary school enrolment in Southern Africa, 2017. Source: AfDB 2020 Figure 15. Human Capital Index in Southern Africa, 2018. Source: AfDB 2020
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Energy sources and 
distribution
Low access to energy in rural areas and 
planned expansion of energy is mostly aimed 
at industrialization and urban areas. Demand 
is projected to grow rapidly up to 2050 with 
potential for major expansion in renewable 
sources. 
Energy is a critical area of the infrastructure pillar of the 
revised SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development 
Plan (RISDP) and considerable preparatory work has 
been done in this area to develop enabling policies, 
systems and processes that will greatly facilitate 
project preparation as well as help to attract private 
sector investments and further promote public-private 
partnerships.
Regional integration of Southern African energy sources 
has been taking place over recent years. To date, nine 
power utilities on the Southern African mainland are 
interconnected, except Angola, Malawi and Tanzania. 
Some degree of integration of power networks 
involving Botswana, DRC, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia has 
been accomplished. This inter-connectivity has facilitated 
the establishment of the Southern African Power Pool 
(SAPP) trading platform, enabling SADC Member States 
with power shortfalls to purchase power from those 
with surplus power within the framework of the regional 
energy security framework. 
At present, the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) is 
largely dominated by non-renewable energy in the form 
of coal. However, more recently, the growth of energy 
from renewable sources is increasing. When taking into 
account the commissioned capacity, hydropower in the 
form of conventional and pumped storage accounted 
for 43%, gas for 24%, solar systems (Photovoltaics and 
Concentrated Solar Power) for 11%, wind for 10% and 
coal occupied only 7% (SADC and SARDC 2018).
The energy mix may, however, change more rapidly than expected, due to the 
rapid decline in prices of renewable energy systems (see figure below).  Solar 
power (and to a lesser extent onshore wind) are essential on par with the costs 
of hydro-power, and increasingly cheaper than any fossil fuel form of electricity 
generation. 
Given climate change’s impacts on water supply, the balance in terms of 
favouring new Photovoltaics (PV) installations vs. hydro, may flip; and if PV costs 
continue to decrease, the potential for rural energy supplies will increase rapidly.
Access to energy in the Southern African region is still highly constrained, 
particularly in rural areas with average access to electricity for only 34% of the 
population.
Energy demand is projected to grow rapidly to 2050. Much of the demand comes 
from expected growth in the industrial sector and rising shares of medium and 
advanced technologies therein. However, under current policy frameworks, rural 
areas are not likely to see a major increase in energy access (SADC and SARDC 
2018).
SADC is planning a significant increase in the uptake of renewables that will allow 
the region to achieve a renewable energy mix of at least 32% by 2020, which 
should rise to 35% by 2030.  Most of this capacity will come from hydropower, 
followed by wind energy, solar PV, concentrated solar power and biomass. 
Development of a harmonized regional policy framework for new and renewable 
energy has been identified as an important step towards realization of SADC’s 
goal of achieving the balance between meeting the region’s energy needs and 
ensuring sustainability of the environment (SADC and SARDC 2018).
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Figure 16. SAPP Installed Generation Mix (2017). Source: SADC and SARDC 2018
Figure 17. Global weighted average levelized cost of electricity from utility-scale 
renewable power generation technologies, 2010 and 2019. Source: IRENA 2020
Figure 18. Energy demand projections by country and category. Source: SADC and 
SADC 2018
TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
The level of investment in agricultural 
research and development is quite low 
for the Southern African region, and 
this is one of the main justifications 
for the World Bank-funded Agricultural 
Productivity Program for Southern Africa 
program (APPSA) implemented in Malawi, 
Mozambique and Zambia (World Bank 
2013). The project appraisal report cites 
work by the ASTI program indicating 
low levels as well as highly fragmented 
investments in agricultural research 
and development (World Bank 2013). In 
2012, SADC established the Centre for 
Coordination of Agricultural Research 
and Development for Southern Africa 
(CCARDESA). 
CCARDESA coordinated the 
implementation of the APPSA project 
and recently published a report on the 
technologies, innovations and management 
practices which were disseminated under 
the project through Regional Centres of 
Leadership. Many of the technologies 
were already available (on the shelf) but 
with dissemination and adoption rates 
quite low. These included improved crop 
varieties for maize, sorghum, legumes and 
improved soil management techniques.
There are significant differences in 
technology use patterns between 
smallholder and medium- to large-scale 
commercial farmers in technology use 
in Southern African agriculture. Several 
studies from Southern African countries 
indicate very low levels of improved 
technology adoption amongst smallholder 
farmers (Arslan et al. 2015; Arslan et al. 





Southern Africa has had lower growth rates than other African regions over the last two years, although GDP per capita is the highest. 
Services are the highest contributor to the region’s GDP. The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is generally quite low across 
all Southern African countries, but its share in employment is generally highest amongst sectors. Youth unemployment is a significant 
problem across Southern African countries. Food prices have increased in the region as have food imports despite expansion of food 
production in the region. 
Economic growth
In 2018 and 2019, the Southern African region had the lowest growth rate amongst 
African regions. This was after having the highest rate of growth during the 2010-2017 
period. Factors contributing to the poor growth were depressed global demand, supply 
side constraints, falling commodity prices and extreme weather patterns of drought 
and cyclones (AfDB 2020). 
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic the expectations were moderate growth for 2020 and 
2021, however, these are now significantly reduced. Projections shown in the figure 
below from the Southern African Economic Outlook Report of 2020 indicate economic 
recovery only in 2021 with a level of growth higher than advanced economies.
policy environment, low public and private sector into value chains and 
unstable power generation capacity have all contributed to reducing the 
region’s competitiveness and economic growth (AfDB 2020).
A striking feature of Southern African economies is the high share of 
employment in the agricultural sector, despite the low share of the sector 
in contributing to GDP in seven of the region’s countries (see table below). 
The service sector is both a significant contributor to GDP and a source of 
employment.
Services dominate the region’s economy, accounting for over 50% of GDP for 
most countries. Industry is the second largest sector in most countries, with only 
Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique having the agriculture sector as the second 
largest contributor to GDP. South Africa is the largest economy, followed by 
Angola, Zambia and Botswana. 
Despite prioritisation of industrialisation development in the Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), progress has been slow. An unfavourable 
Figure 19. Real GDP growth rate comparisons between different world regions, 
2011-2021 (%). Source: AfDB 2020










Angola 49 9.2 8 44.4 43 46.4
Botswana 23 2.3 18 34.4 59 63.8
Eswatini 13 9.5 24 37.3 63 53.3
Lesotho 67 6.2 10 34.8 23 59.1
Madagascar 68 28.5 7 20.2 25 51.3
Malawi 72 30.4 8 15.3 20 54.3
Mauritius 7 3.5 27 21 66 75.5
Mozambique 71 24.7 8 22.7 21 52.6
Namibia 20 7.1 19 31.3 61 61.6
Sao Tome & 
Principe 23 12.3 18 16.4 59 71
South Africa 5 2.5 23 29.3 72 68.2
Zambia 54 5.2 11 37.3 36 57.5
Zimbabwe 67 9.2 7 25.1 25 62.7
Table 5. Sectoral employment (%) versus sectoral GDP contributions (%), 
2019. Source: AfDB 2020
Employment
The region is expected to have a major increase in the workforce due to a demographic youth 
bulge. Presently, the highest rates of employment are in informal economy with low returns. 
Agriculture is the sector with the highest employment shares in most countries. 
The Southern African region has the highest levels of unemployment in Africa, with youth unemployment in double digits 
for most countries (AfDB 2020).  
As shown in figure 21 from the IFAD 2019 Rural Development Report, rural youth populations in sub-Saharan 
Africa are projected to increase in regions and countries with low rates of structural and rural transformation 
(measured by the share of GDP from non-agricultural activities, and value added per agricultural worker, 
respectively). However, three countries in the Southern African region, namely, South Africa, Eswatini and 
Namibia, are the only sub-Saharan African countries that have achieved high levels of both structural and 
rural transformation.
institutions and low labour absorption capacity in industries. Essentially, there has not been sufficient 
importance given to employment growth in development policies. High unemployment rates are an 
important factor in the region’s huge income inequalities.  
The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to exacerbate unemployment in the hardest hit sectors such as tourism 
and hospitality, entertainment, retail and trade, and agriculture, where most of the people in the region are 
employed. The small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the informal economy in general, which are big 
employers in some of the regional countries, will also be adversely affected due to the national lockdowns 
and slowdown in business activity. Without government support, the majority of workers are at risk of 
losing jobs, thus, compounding the unemployment statistics (AfDB 2020).
Figure 20. Unemployment by country in Southern Africa, 2010-2018). Source: AfDB 2019




Food prices have increased in recent years and are expected to continue 
to do so. Even though food production in the Southern African region has 
expanded significantly, food imports have also increased. High levels of 
food price volatility can be expected as production faces increasing risks 
from climate change. 
Food demand in sub-Saharan Africa is increasing rapidly, driven by population and 
income growth. Domestic production has not been sufficient to meet this increased 
demand, and thus an increasing share of food is supplied through imports. Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s food import bill increased seven-fold between 2001-2014—from USD 6 billion to 
USD 45 billion (Jayne et al. 2017). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the ratio of the value of food imports as a percentage of the value 
of domestic agricultural output has been steadily rising since 2000, from 9.2% in 2001 to 
24.1% in 2014 (see figure below). The greatest share of sub-Saharan Africa’s total food 
imports is coming from countries outside the region. Food grain and oilseed imports (for 
animal feed) are driving rising food deficits, accounting for roughly 60% of the region’s 
total food import bill (FAOSTAT 2017). These patterns reflect the region’s inability to 
increase local food production fast enough over the past three decades to keep up with 
its rapidly growing population as well as the rising income-related growth in food demand.
The regional level of food price volatility in SADC is considerably higher than that of 
any one country in the region—with the exception of Mauritius. Food price volatility 
is only weakly correlated between the SADC countries. These two conditions 
indicate high potential for reducing food price volatility through intra-regional trade. 
At present, SADC has the highest share of regional trade amongst the African 
regional economic communities (RECs) at 42%, compared with 6% for the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 20% for the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Although SADC is doing much better than 
the other two RECs, its member countries still account for far less than half of the 
value of agricultural trade within the region (Badiane et al. 2014).
Food prices in the Southern African region have risen over recent years, as exhibited 
in the graph below showing changes in the Consumer Food Price Index from 2011 to 
2019 for five countries in the region. The index is close to doubling over the period.
Figure 22. Value of food imports as a percentage of the value of domestic 
agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Jayne et al. 2017
Figure 23. Consumer Food Price Index, 2011-2019. Source: FAOSTAT11





The SADC region has experienced ups and downs in exports to world markets. The 
value of SADC exports rose from just under USD 50 billion in 2000 to USD 225 billion 
2011, but then declined to USD 168 billion in 2017 with the collapse in commodity 
prices. Trends in the share of SADC in world exports followed a similar pattern, rising 
from 0.8% in 2000 to 1.2% in 2011 and then declining to 1% in 2017 (Black et al. 
2019). 
Intra-regional trade in SADC has increased over the 2000-2017 period. Intra-SADC 
export shares exceed 30% for Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Eswatini (94% in 2017), 
DRC and Zimbabwe. In contrast, Angola, Comoros, Seychelles and Madagascar 
export less than 10% of their goods to the SADC region (Black et al. 2019). Fewer 
countries experienced rising shares of imports from intra-SADC trade over the same 
period, however. South Africa is both the major source of intra-regional exports as 
well as the primary market for other SADC country exports. 
There is a significantly higher share of manufactured goods being exported at the 
intra-regional level, compared with the extra-regional exports as shown in the figure 
below. This indicates considerable potential for enhancing industrial development 
through intra-regional trade (Black et al. 2019).
imports. The real net import value of processed products in 2017 was less 
than a third of that in 2012 (Meyers at al. 2019). 
The SADC region is typically an exporter of unprocessed but perishable 
agricultural products which has remained fairly constant over the period of 2010-
2017. Until 2012 it was also a major importer of processed agricultural products 
but since then there has been a major reduction in the share of processed food 
The SADC region continues to import significant amounts of products for 
which it lacks comparative advantage or competitiveness such as wheat 
and rice, and chicken meat. The graph below categorizes all agricultural 
imports and exports for the SADC region into 15 categories and tracks 
their levels over the 2010-2017 period.
The likelihood that these historical trends will continue 
into the future depends on the development of global 
markets, which, in turn, rests on the stability of world 
order and market demand for today’s commodities. 
As discussed above, market dynamics may change 
if dietary preferences shift (driven by health and 
sustainability concerns), and if geopolitical and trade 
instability increases, the costs and benefits to trade 
will change. These issues are further discussed in the 
Scenarios sections in the following pages.
Figure 24. Composition of intra- and extra-SADC trade in goods, 2015 (%). Source: 
Black et al. 2019
Figure 25. Net trade in agricultural products for the SADC region. Source: 
Meyers et al. 2019
Figure 26. Average net trade position of all agricultural products in the SADC 
region, 2010-2017. Source: Meyers et al. 2019
Photo: Mahdiar Mahmoodi-unsplash
ECOLOGICAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRENDS
Land degradation is a major problem throughout the Southern African region contributing to low agricultural 
productivity. Water scarcity is an urgent issue in the southern countries of the region, but not the north. Generally, 
water use efficiency is greater in the south than the north, however, levels of interbasin transfers are not common.
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Land degradation
Land degradation is widespread in sub-
Saharan Africa. A report by the Montpellier 
Panel published in 2014 indicates that 
around 65% of arable land in sub-Saharan 
Africa is already degraded, which is 
costing more than 180 million smallholder 
farmers around USD 68 million in lost 
income annually (Montpellier Panel 2014). 
Poor soil quality tends to depress the 
effects of conventional inorganic fertilizers 
and realizing the benefits of improved plant 
varieties (Jayne et al. 2017).
A map of hotspots of land degradation 
using biomass productivity indicates 
considerable degradation in the Southern 
African region.
Figure 27. Biomass based mapping of land 
degradation hotspots. Source: Montpelier 
Panel 2014 based on Le QB, Nkonya E, 
Mirzabaev A. 2014. Biomass Productivity-
Based Mapping of Global Land Degradation 
Hotspots. ZEF-Discussion Papers on 
Development Policy. Bonn: Center for 
Development Research (ZEF).
Addressing the issue of land degradation is fundamental to achieving 
resilient agricultural livelihoods in Southern Africa. Land degradation 
is associated with poverty, given the importance of agriculture in the 
livelihoods of Africa’s poor (Barrett and Bevis 2015). It also raises 
the importance of the distribution of especially fertile land and the 
insecurity of land rights in a number of countries in Southern and 
Eastern Africa as well as the imperfect functioning of Africa’s land 
markets (Barrett et al. 2017).
In Southern Africa, increasing population pressures leading to 
reduction in fallows and continuous cropping without inputs has 
resulted in soils depleted of nutrients. Soil fertility decline has led to 
declines in crop yields in the region (Vlek et al. 2019). 
In the Southern African region soils are generally of poor quality with 
low organic content and low water retention (Vlek et al. 2019). 
In most of Namibia and Botswana and the northwestern part of 
South Africa the soils are sandy, with low soil organic matter.
In Lesotho over 70% of the soils are acidic, have low organic 
matter, low pH and are infertile.  
In South Africa over 30% of the soils are sandy and over 60% are 
low in soil organic matter, and exhibit high levels of degradation 
and low productivity.
In Malawi soil erosion is a major cause of low productivity with an 
estimated loss of 20 kg of N and 30 kg of P annually.
Mozambique is estimated to lose 112 kg of N, 60 kg P203 and 116 
kg of K20 annually.
Water scarcity
Water availability in Southern Africa is variable both in time and spatially wherein 
some parts of the region are experiencing scarcity and other parts abundance. 
The region is characterized by a wetter north and drier south, demarcated by the 
860mm/a isohyet (the red line in the figure below) (CRIDF 2014).
Water scarcity is a reality and a growing concern in several 
parts of the Southern African region. Population growth and 
associated demands for domestic, agricultural, and industrial 
use are increasing stress on limited water resources. In 
addition, rainfall patterns are changing with climate change, 
and some areas are likely to experience increased water 
shortages. Water use in the SADC Member States varies 
widely and a majority of the region’s approximately 200 million 
people lack access to basic safe water (SADC 2013a).
Blue water availability varies significantly across the region 
from over 8000 m3/cap/yr in the DRC to 869 m3/cap/yr in 
South Africa (CRIDF 2014). This is due not only to rainfall and 
runoff but also population dependency on the resource. The 
most stressed countries are not those with the lowest rainfall 
but those with high water demand relative to rainfall such as 
Eswatini with huge water withdrawals for irrigating sugarcane. 
South Africa stands out as the most water stressed—and also 
most vulnerable to climate change (CRIDF 2014).
At present, in Southern Africa, 12about 85% of surface and 
groundwater is used for agriculture (Vlek et al. 2019). The 
share of irrigated land is less than 20% and primarily in South 
Africa.
Botswana and South Africa are the largest importers of virtual 
water, with 45 and 21% of their water footprint imported 
respectively (CRIDF 2014).
There are three pivotal water basins in the SADC region: 
the Incomati, Limpopo and Orang/Senqu (CRIDF 2014). 
Management of these across SADC is a key requirement for 
the region to achieve its development goals. However, this 
is proving complicated as discussed in the section on water 
management policy below.
Real water exports, such as interbasin transfers between the regions, are not 
common, with the most significant occurring between Lesotho and South 
Africa. The latter has invested heavily in dam infrastructure in the former to 
supply the densely populated and highly industrialized Gauteng province of 
South Africa.  This has been to the detriment of local small-scale farmers in 
Lesotho for whom the inundated land is no longer accessible (Johnston and 
Chapman 2016).
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Figure 28. Rainfall across mainland SADC, showing 860mm/a isohyet. The figure in 
the brackets is the country average rainfall in mm. Source: CRIDF 2014 
Figure 29. Three basins in the SADC region. Source: CRIDF 2014
12 Includes Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Photo: Inge Maria-unsplash
POLITICAL
The Southern African region is one of the most 
stable politically in Africa, albeit cases of political 
strife and even armed conflict have occurred in 
the region. The level of regional integration is 
complicated by the overwhelming strength of 
the South African economy compared with other 
countries in the SADC community. 
The weakest aspect of regional integration 
is in infrastructural integration (including 
water management and electricity). Successful 
coordination in managing water is essential to 
achieving SADC’s development goals but has not 
yet been attained.
According to African Development Bank, the Southern 
African region is the most stable region in Africa, being 
largely peaceful. However, there have been instances of 
political crises, democracy and governance deficits, and 
even armed conflict. Lesotho had political instability and 
a security crisis in 2015 and 2017. Angola had a new 
president in 2017 after 38 years, and Zimbabwe in 2018 
after 37 years. South Africa witnessed changes in political 
leadership likely to boost investor confidence. Botswana 
continues to rank as a peaceful country on the global peace 
index, remaining in second place in Africa after Mauritius.
The level of regional integration is a key indicator 
of governance. Regional integration has historically 
constituted an integral part of development strategies in 
Africa. It has been viewed as a means to achieve sustained 
economic growth and development and to overcome the 
region’s structural problems such as political fragmentation, 
lower per capita incomes and small intra-regional markets. 
In a joint effort by the African Union, the African 
Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa, analysis of the level of regional integration is 
conducted using sixteen different indicators, grouped into 
five dimensions. The dimensions and associated indicators 
are shown in the figure on the right.
Assessing the level of integration across the continent’s regional economic communities 
indicated that the lowest points for overall integration are scored by SADC at 0.337 and the 
highest score overall is obtained by the East African Community (EAC) at 0.537. 
County level analysis indicates that SADC’s top performers are South Africa, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe; its bottom performers are the DRC, Angola and Eswatini. SADC’s country 
rankings appear to reflect the current state of socioeconomic integration in the community, 
where the best-performing countries have flourishing economies and enjoy a relatively good 
standard of living. SADC’s strength lies in the free movement of people, and is weakest on 
infrastructural integration. 
Figure 30. The dimensions and indicators of regional integration. Source: AU, AfDB, UNECA 2019
Figure 31. SADC’s scores on the five dimensions of regional 
integration. Source: AU, AfDB, UNECA 2019
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Intra-regional levels of global power Indicators of institutional performance
Intra-regional cooperation is affected by the relative levels of power in the SADC 
Member States. One measure of global power has been developed by the 
International Futures (Ifs) forecasting tool. This tool calculates each country’s 
portion of global power by weighting its share of global GDP (at exchange rates or 
purchasing power parity), population, a measure of technological sophistication 
(with GDP per capita as a proxy), government size, conventional military power and 
nuclear military power (Hughes 2014). 
A study by the ISS using this tool to compare projections of power among SADC 
countries showed that by 2040 Angola will be the only country that approaches 
South Africa, but that the latter will still wield more power potential. The only other 
country in SADC that will come close to these two heavyweights is Tanzania, largely 
because of rapid population growth (Louw-Vadren 2018).
In order to get a snapshot of institutional performance in SADC countries, three indicators of 
institutional performance from the WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2019 were selected. 
The indicators and their definition are as follows:
C&B (Checks and Balances) includes measures of budget transparency, judicial 
independence, efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations and freedom of the 
press.
Trans (Transparency) is a measure of the incidence of corruption.
Future (Future orientation of the government) includes measures of government 
ensuring policy stability, governments’ responsiveness to change, legal framework’s adaptability 
to digital business models, government long-term vision, energy efficiency regulation, renewable 
energy regulation and environment-related treaties in force. 
All three indicators go from a range of 0 to 100 with 100 as the best performance. 
These statistics are put together by WEF from various sources including a survey of business 
leaders in each country.
Overall, the performance ratings are low with several countries scoring in the 30s and 40s. Namibia, 
Seychelles and Botswana score quite high on the future orientation of the government (in the 60s), 
while South Africa, Namibia and Mauritius are highest scorers on checks and balances.
The vastly higher level of global power 
held by South Africa creates tensions in 
achieving regional integration. According 
to Sokos (2018), economic integration 
within SADC has been marked by severe 
economic imbalances amongst SADC 
Member States and has been skewed in 
favour of South Africa. South Africa plays 
a dominant role in the Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU), although such 
a position is unlikely to be maintained in 
an enlarged SACU agreement. Success 
of regional integration in Southern 
Africa depends on South Africa’s ability 
to discharge its responsibilities in 
accordance with its hegemonic status 
(Sokos 2018).  
A major source of tension in the SADC 
region is South Africa’s outward looking 
stance on trade. South Africa has a 
unilateral trade agreement with the 
EU, which creates concerns amongst 
other SADC members that they would 
lose revenue from imports under the 
revenue sharing agreement due to lower 
common external tariff rates for South 
Africa (Brenton and Hoffman 2016). 
The bilateral EC-South Africa trade 
agreement contributed to fragmentation 
of SADC trade relationships with the 
EU, and substantially complicates the 
development of an enlarged customs 
union for the region (Brenton and 
Hoffman 2016). This is one reason efforts 
toward further integration have stalled 
and SADC is now engaged in developing 
the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
Agreement, which is seen as a critical 
stepping-stone toward the grander plan 
for a continental free trade area by 2017. 
Figure 32. Distribution of power in select SADC countries (1994-2040). Source: : 
Louw-Vadren 2018
Figure 33. Indicators of institutional perfomance in the SADC countries, 2018. Source: Author’s 
analysis of WEF World Competitiveness Report 2019 data
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Agricultural policy
The SADC Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP) reflects the intention of SADC to develop a legally ‘binding’ instrument to stimulate sustainable agricultural development and food security in the SADC region (SADC 2013). 
The RAP lays out four main goals: i.) Enhance sustainable agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness; ii.) Improve regional and international trade and access to markets of agricultural products; iii. Improve private and 
public sector engagement and investment in the agricultural value-chains; and iv.) Reduce social and economic vulnerability of the region’s population in the context of food and nutrition security and the changing economic and climatic 
environment. As can be seen from the analysis provided in the section on agricultural productivity growth below, there is still considerable need for enhancing sustainable and productive agricultural growth in the region.  
SADC has made progress on improving regional trade in agricultural products. Compared with other regional trade agreements (RTAs), the SADC region has one of the least distorting policy framework for agricultural products after the 
Accelerated Program for Economic Integration (APEI) (see figures below).
Figure 34. Applied weighted mean tariffs for primary products for sub-Saharan Africa (left) and regional trade agreement (right). Source: Brenton and Hoffman 2016
According to the draft RISDP 
2020-2030 blueprints, the 
priority is to implement and 
enforce the measures outlined in 
the RAP and the accompanying 
Regional Agricultural Investment 
Policy (RAIP) 2017-2022 which 
was approved in 2016. The RAIP 
includes a budget of USD 1.3 
billion. In March 2019, a program 
of EUR 9 million to support the 
operationalization of the RAP 
was initiated with funding from 
the EU and technical support 




The allocation of water resources between SADC countries is 
governed by the Revised SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses, 
which came into force in 2003. The objective of the Protocol is to 
“foster closer cooperation for judicious, sustainable and coordinated 
management, protection and utilisation of shared watercourses 
and advance the SADC agenda of regional integration and poverty 
reduction” (SADC 2005). A large number of countries within SADC 
share river boundaries, and therefore potential future risks of meeting 
the allocation requirements need to be considered. 
There are a number of agreements between SADC countries with 
regards to required allocation of water resources between them. 
Tensions have arisen in the past, and with future climate stressors 
there is a high likelihood that the enforceability or meeting of 
legislative requirements becomes paramount. Such agreements and 
partnerships are necessary to ensure sustainable water management 
prevails. 
The SADC region has 21 transboundary river basins to manage and 
these fall into 3 categories: 1) Those that include non-SADC states 
and thus the SADC water protocol may not apply; 2) Those falling 
within SADC and equally across states and so more easily co-
managed or those falling almost exclusively in one state; and 3) River 
basins not conducive to dams or water management and thus with 
erratic supply (CRIDF 2014).
Management of the Incomati Basin illustrates the complications 
involved. Located within Mozambique (31%), South Africa (63%) 
and Swaziland (6%), the Incomati Basin is relatively small, but is of 
strategic importance. The Incomati River flows from the eastern part 
of South Africa, through north Swaziland and into the southern part 
of Mozambique, where it discharges into the ocean. Coordination in 
water use is paramount to avoiding conflicts and water shortages. 
In 1982, during a drought in the region, the Incomati River dried 
up. Mozambique, in expressing concerns about the water levels, 
learned that South Africa and Swaziland were planning to build 
dams upstream which would have drastically affected supply to 
Mozambique. Following a number World Economic Forum 2019 
Global Competitiveness Index of meetings and discussions, the 
Tripartite Agreement on the Projections and Sustainable Utilization of 
the Water Resources of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourses (TIA) 
was signed in 2002 between the 3 countries (CRIDF 2014).
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AGRICULTURE AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
The Southern African region is characterized by low or even negative productivity growth in agriculture and with most of the 
growth obtained through agricultural land expansion rather than more efficient use of agricultural inputs. At present, most 
production and irrigated area occurs in the arid south. The northern areas have greater potential for further development. Middle 
income countries generally did better than low income countries on both land and labour productivity growth for crops and 
overall productivity for livestock production over recent years. Post-harvest losses are over 30%.
The Southern African region is characterized by four ecozone 
bands mostly determined by rainfall patterns and ranging from 
semi-arid and desert conditions in the southwest, and humid 
and tropical conditions in the north and east. Cereal production 
is dominantly rainfed and covers more than 50% of the 
agricultural land in the Southern African countries of Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Vlek et al. 2019). Maize is 
the dominant crop with nearly 10 million hectares followed by 
sorghum, millet and wheat with about 1 million hectares each. 
There are two major farming systems that dominate land use 
in the 9 countries of the Southern African region listed above. 
These are the mixed maize system and the agro-pastoral 
systems. Both are currently low productivity and low intensity.  
Of the total area of the 16 SADC Member States (986,246,000 
ha), only 6 is cultivated (Nhamo et al. 2019). Smallholder farming 
is the main source of livelihoods in rural areas and is mostly 
rainfed, relying on increasing variable patterns of rainfall. Land 
with irrigation potential is about 20 million ha, yet only 3.9 million 
ha is actually irrigated. 
Most food production (including exports) and irrigation in the 
region occurs in the arid south—in South Africa by a large 
margin. Further north, in Angola, Zambia, and the northern parts 
of Mozambique, water resources are abundant, yet irrigation 
farming is far less developed and inefficient, resulting in water 
resources being less intensely managed (Vlek et al. 2014).
The figure above from CRIDF (2014) shows the distribution of agricultural 
potential for part of the SADC region determined by the amount of 
uncultivated land and water constraints. 
In recent years, maize production has been decreasing in most countries in 
the region mainly due to extreme droughts and floods (Nhamo et al. 2019). 
Table 6 from Nhamo et al. (2019) shows the deficit levels of maize production 
for the recent past.













No. of Affected  
People in 2016
Angola 1366 1878 1500 -20 756,000
Botswana 21 4 1 -75 1,100,000
Lesotho 74 79 25 -68 709,000
Madagascar 393 350 300 -14 1,400,000
Malawi 3583 2776 2369 -15 6,500,00
Mozambique 1602 1357 1350 -1 2,000,000
Namibia 61 38 46 21 729,000
South Africa 12,345 10,629 7733 -27 14,300,000
Swaziland 89 82 33 -60 638,000
Zambia 2894 2618 2873 10 976,000
Zimbabwe 1083 742 512 -31 4,000,000
Table 6. 2016 maize production deficit in SADC countries and the number of affected people. Source: Nhamo 
et al. 2019
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Agricultural growth rates as measured by changes in the agricultural GDP in the region have been low and most 
have not met the CAADP target of a 6% growth rate. Several countries had lower growth rates in the 2003-2010 
period as compared with the 1995-2003 period, with Namibia and Zimbabwe showing negative rates in the later 
period (see figure 36).
Turning to the growth in crop output over the 2000-2011 period, five countries of the fifteen SADC countries 
analysed had negative growth rates. Angola, which has a roots and tuber farming system in its northern 
region had a significantly higher increase in crop output compared with all other countries.
Figure 36. Average yearly agricultural GDP growth rate (%). Source: Badiane and Collins 2016
Figure 37. Growth in crop output, 2000-2011. Source: Chilondra et al. 2013
Growth rates of land and labour productivity over the 2000-2010 period vary considerably over the fifteen SADC countries 
analysed. Four countries—Seychelles Zimbabwe, DRC and Lesotho—showed negative growth in labour productivity. 
South Africa showed the highest level of growth in labour productivity growth and Angola showed the highest growth in 
land productivity. 
The middle-income countries were found to have higher labour productivity than the low-income countries, although 
land productivity in the low-income countries was higher. However, the middle-income countries had higher growth rates 
in both labour and land productivity compared with the lower-income SADC countries. Labour productivity grew at an 
annual average of 0.1% in the SADC middle-income countries during the 1980-2010 period, while labour productivity 
declined in the low-income countries at an annual rate of -0.4% for the same period (Chilondra et al. 2013).
Trends in livestock productivity also show considerable variation across SADC countries with the middle-income 
countries showing higher levels than the low-income countries and South Africa dominating
Cereal yields in the region for the 2000-2010 and again for 2010 to 2017 period were generally 
stagnant. Several countries were below the RIDSP target level of 2,000 kg/ha.
Figure 38. Trends in cereal yield in SADC countries, 2000-2010. Source: Chilondra et al. 2013
Figure 40. Growth rates in labour and land productivity in SADC countries (annual average, 2000-2010). Source: 
Chilondra et al. 2013
Figure 39. Average cereal yield in the SADC countries, 2010-2017. Source: World Development 
Bank WDI Indicators13
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Overall, for the 2000-2010 time period and the fifteen SADC countries analysed, the countries that made 
substantial improvements in land productivity in 2000-2010 include Angola and South Africa in the middle-
income countries, and Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique in the low-income countries. 
In terms of labour productivity, Angola, Mauritius, South Africa and Eswatini grew substantially from the middle-
income countries in 2000-2010, while Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia grew substantially from the low-income 
countries during the same period. As such, Angola, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Eswatini and Tanzania are 
the countries that performed well over this period in terms of both land and labour productivity (Chilondra et al. 
2013). 
Analysis of the sources of productivity growth indicate that agricultural land expansion was a significant 
contributor. The growth in total factor productivity was generally quite low for countries in the region with only 
South Africa showing major growth (see map on the right).
Pre- and post-harvest losses in Southern Africa amount to 30% or more. Areas where food production systems 
are intensified and serve commercial markets such losses need to be eliminated through proper pest management, 
extension and infrastructural investments (Ransom et al. 2019).
Figure 41. Trends in per capita livestock production in SADC countries, 1990-2010. Source: Chilondra et al. 2013
Figure 42. Gains in agricultural total factor productivity varied greatly across countries from 1971 to 2015. Source: 
Fuglie et al. 2019
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03Thinking About an Uncertain Future: 
Strategizing Under Uncertainty
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The section above described fifteen mega-trends for the Southern 
African region, detailing recent patterns for these key drivers of 
today’s conditions. However, we cannot assume these trends will continue 
into the future as they have in the recent past. High-impact, large-scale, disruptive 
events—such as COVID-19—are likely to grow in frequency as the world changes, 
becomes more interconnected, is put under greater pressure through demand and 
consumption growth, and is challenged by environmental change-related events 
arising from increasingly extreme weather, or emergence of pests and diseases. 
Such events change the evolution of drivers—through changing economies, markets, 
social attitudes, politics and geo-politics.
The future is far from predictable—even with the most detailed and complete 
analysis of mega-trends to rely upon. This unpredictability is summed up with 
acronym “TUNA”: Turbulent, Uncertain, Novel, Ambiguous (Ramírez 
and Wilkinson 2016). The future is turbulent because of its systemic fragility and 
non-linearity, meaning events can lead to escalating impacts (Homer-Dixon et al. 
2015); uncertain because these are often highly unpredictable and, from a climate 
perspective, unknown; novel because technological, social and environmental 
change create unprecedented situations; and ambiguous because every problem or 
solution is wicked—with both “winners” and “losers”.
The mega-trends identified are also typically contributing towards increasing 
uncertainty through undermining environmental sustainability. For example, 
economic and population growth drive unsustainable patterns of consumption, 
which drive climate change that then reduces the likelihood of existing trends 
continuing in a linear fashion because it contributes to disruption and destabilisation 
of our ways of living. In the long term, therefore, continuation of the “business-as-
usual” global mega-trends is not at all likely nor desirable. 
Furthermore, current economic growth modalities are facilitated by developing 
complex trade networks and just-in-time supply chains. Increasing connectivity 
between nations means that events or hazards occurring in one part of the world can 
create a cascade of effects that have widespread and diffuse impacts. Just-in-time 
supply chains increase vulnerabilities to hazard events; by removing redundancy 
in the name of efficiency, if something happens, the supply chains grind to a halt. 
Such shocks, like COVID-19, may be disruptive enough that they also unshackle 
“business-as-usual lock-in” and disruptively provide opportunities for rapid change. 
Given this, what might the future look like and how can the mega-trend analysis help 
in diagnosing it?
Scenarios
Aiding decision-making under 
uncertainty
Scenarios are a route to aid decision making under 
uncertainty (Courtney et al. 1997), when past trends 
cannot necessarily be extrapolated into the future with 
confidence, and where the future is likely to be shaped by 
drivers or events which may plausibly lead to very different 
outcomes. 
Scenarios can inform today’s thinking about strategic 
decisions through exploring different possible futures. 
They examine a range of plausible futures, not to forecast 
what they may be like, but to provide a mechanism for 
thinking through the challenges that might be encountered 
and the opportunities that might arise. Scenarios are most 
useful when there is uncertainty about some of the factors 
that may significantly shape the future and when a range 
of outcomes may be plausible (even if some are more 
plausible than others). 
Decisions need to be taken today against the backdrop of 
future uncertainty, and many will play out over timescales 
during which things may change radically. Thus, scenarios 
can be a tool to examine blind spots and broaden 
perspectives; they are less about “betting on a future” 
and more about stress-testing plans to see—if the world 
diverged from existing trends—whether decisions made 
in the near future would remain “fit for purpose”. Can our 
plans be robust to alternative futures? Given how TUNA 
the current world is looking, scenario thinking is more 
important than ever before.
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Scenarios
Mega-trends in the context of recent 
food system scenarios
A number of scenarios analyses have been published recently for 
food systems. 14Whilst scenarios may take a variety of forms, a 
common approach is to use participatory processes to identify the 
two most important drivers which will shape the future, but about 
which there is great uncertainty in terms of what form they will 
take. A recent report taking this approach and asking “what will 
global food systems be like in 2050?” was published by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) in 2017 (WEF 2017).
The WEF’s two key axes were chosen because they are inherently 
unknown in terms of how they may develop but are very strong 
determinants of the way local food systems may be shaped.
The two dominant factors were: 
Dietary shifts: away from dependence on food systems 
that have focussed on growing calorie-rich but nutrient-
poor diets resulting in high externalised costs on health and 
environment, to food systems that provide more 
healthy diets in more sustainable ways (Swinburn 
et al. 2020). The drivers for such shifts include climate 
mitigation, the costs of malnutrition and associated non-
communicable diseases (whether from the perspective of 
(a) improving personal health; 
(b) business productivity and economic growth 
(Wellesley et al. 2020); or 
(c) the social costs of poor public health), impacts 
on health from production (the rise of anti-microbial 
resistance from intensive livestock production, urban 
air quality being impacted by intensive agriculture 
and volatilization of nitrogenous fertiliser) and pursuit 
of environmental sustainability (e.g., reduction in 
plastic waste, reduction in land degradation, reversing 
biodiversity losses, reduction in food waste, societal 
demand for fewer pesticides to be used in agriculture). 
Other exercises that consider the shift to healthy and/or 
sustainable diets include Agrimonde,15the EU JRC’s food 
systems’ foresight study (Bock et al. 2014) and the Shared 
Socio-Economic Pathway 1 for the IPCC (O’Neill et al. 2017).
Whilst “healthy diets” are not exactly synonymous with 
“sustainable diets” there is a significant overlap between the 
two as (a) healthier diets have caloric and nutrient intakes 
that better match dietary requirements, and (b) healthier 
diets are typically higher in plant-produced foods, and less 
reliant on meat and dairy, with livestock products’ high 
environmental footprints (Aleksandrowicz et al. 2016; Nelson 
et al. 2016). Hence, given the alignment between diets that 
are healthy and sustainable, and the costs of diets that are 
neither, the two are increasingly addressed together.
Shifts in the momentum for globalised trade 
towards more regional or local food systems. The 
last five years’ geopolitical trends impact on the globalisation 
agenda, to the point where “deglobalisation” is discussed. 
This arises from changes in the last few years that undermine 
the post-war architecture of international cooperation, in 
association with the rise of inward-looking and protectionist 
policies driven by increasing global inequality, including 
migration. These new trends have made a future of ever more 
liberal trade look uncertain as market-distorting barriers are 
erected. COVID-19, other forms of disruption from climate 
change and environmental breakdown, alongside geopolitical 
instability can also undermine supply chain resilience, leading 
to a perceived need for more local sourcing from a local 
security—or resilience—perspective. 
Attitudinal change (such as the belief that local food is 
somehow better) might also drive such a change. The WEF 
scenarios exercise is not alone in considering the future 
of globalisation: the EU JRC’s food safety foresight study 
(Mylona et al. 2016) and its scoping study, the EC’s Food 
safety and nutrition in 2050 scenarios report (FCEC 2013), as 
well as the IPCC’s Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (e.g., 
SSP3) all consider more regionalised economies (O’Neill et 
al. 2017). 
The US (NIC 2017) and UK (Ministry of Defence UK 2018) 
governments publish security-facing “Global Strategic 
Trends” reports; the most recent editions both utilise 
scenarios which consider radical change to the international 
architecture of trade and cooperation. Other reports have 
highlighted the balance of risks, benefits and costs of trade, 
including the UK’s climate change risk assessment (Challinor 
et al. 2016) and the EU JRC’s 2030 foresight report on food 




14 See a compilation at https://www.foresight4food.net/ 15 https://www.cirad.fr/en/publications-resources/publishing/studies-and-documents/agrimonde-terra-foresight-study
Scenarios for the future of food 
systems in Southern and Eastern 
Africa: the AFRICAP results
How would the drivers, uncertainties and scenarios for food 
systems change if we move from the global level to analyses 
specific to the Southern African region? The UK Global Challenge 
Research funded project, Agricultural and Food-system Resilience: 
Increasing Capacity and Advising Policy (AFRICAP), recently ran 
participatory scenario exercises in four countries: Malawi, South 
Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The exercises brought together 
stakeholders (approximately 200 across the four countries) for four 
day-long workshops to discuss the drivers shaping the future of 
agri-food systems in each of the four countries, and to agree and 
articulate sets of plausible alternative futures. These narrative-
based futures have subsequently been utilised to quantitatively 
model various agri-food development pathways, with the objective 
of maximising positive and minimising negative outcomes to ensure 
each country’s pathway is concordant with the vision of “The Africa 
We Want” of the AU’s Agenda 2063. Participants included national 
and regional government officials and policy stakeholders, research 
academics and civil society representatives, plus facilitators from 
AFRICAP. 
The methodology within each workshop was to list the factors 
that would shape the food system—the mega-trends and drivers, 
and then to separate them into “known knowns” and “known 
unknowns”. The “known knowns” are drivers about which there 
is low predictive uncertainty into the future: participants are sure 
about their magnitude. For example, the demographic distribution 
of a country’s population can be projected into the future with 
relative uncertainty. “Known unknowns”, in contrast, are drivers 
that there is certainty about that they will play a role in shaping the 
future, but will impact very different depending on the form they 
may take (for example, whether the world is more globalised or less 
globalised makes a radical difference to the drivers of agriculture). 
The standard methodology is to use an iterated series of discussions and anonymous voting to pick the two most influential “known unknowns” 
to create a set of orthogonal axes defining four scenarios.  
Interestingly, stakeholders in all four countries agreed that climate risks and how they would play out was one of the two critical uncertainties. 
The second axis varied by country:
Land tenure and reform (little versus radical) (South Africa);
Technology innovation and adoption (weak versus strong) (Tanzania);
Market access and functioning local to global (weak versus strong) (Zambia); and
Effective policy implementation aligned to deliver food systems outcomes (versus poorly aligned, silo-ed, policy) (Malawi).
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Whilst the “known unknowns” varied by country, the five axes were 
discussed in each country, and are thus a representative set of the 
concerns for countries in Southern Africa. The sets of axes create 
four sets of scenarios, 16with each quadrant being developed into a 
narrative interpreting how the world in each quadrant would “feel”.
It is instructive to examine the axes in turn.
Climate risks: from low to high
The issues considered as important in the sample 
countries included the following key questions: 
How will changes in rainfall and water availability affect food 
production and demand, pests and diseases, and land use?
What can be grown where, in view of rainfall patterns and water 
availability? 
What options for adaptation are there in the agricultural sector? 
Will different sections of society be more/less vulnerable to climate 
change? 
What will happen to the incidence of “natural disasters” like 
Cyclone Idai?
How will climate change elsewhere affect the potential for trade 
(export markets and import trade flows underpinning food and 
nutrition security)? 
How will the government mitigate the impacts of climate change? 
Will international efforts to address climate change be successful?
A world of lower climate risk would occur where the global actions 
to mitigate climate risks were successful, and so weather patterns 
continued to change beyond how they are now, but broadly in line with 
projections from a low emissions scenario (RCP 2.6). Thus, climate 
risks will increase beyond today, but not as rapidly as within a high 
emissions scenario (e.g., RCP 6.0). Weather will therefore continue 
to change, volatility in international markets increase due to shocks 
arising from weather impacts. However, the implication of the world 
adopting a low-mitigation pathway also suggests stronger climate 
ambition towards carbon neutrality. That in turn has implications for 
agriculture and its markets (e.g., the increase in land use for carbon 
storage, dietary shifts in global markets towards plant-based diets, 
etc). Thus, a “low risk” scenario implies both coping with changing 
weather, but also suggests significant structural changes to agriculture 
through land-based mitigation. 17A world of “higher climate risks” 
implies less immediate structural change in agricultural markets but 
increasingly large impacts from climate change. These would drive 
significant market volatility within any country, regionally and globally. 
Thus, adaptation to extremes becomes more challenging, and 
ultimately structural change may arise from market shocks in future 
decades.
Access to markets (low to high)
The key questions raised across the sample countries included market 
access locally, regionally and internationally, and how it was facilitated 
through regulation and investment in both hard infrastructure (e.g., 
transport networks) and soft infrastructure (information technology). 
Furthermore, the issues of how the markets functioned to match 
supply with demand, their volatility and the market-prices (to farmers 
and consumers) were important considerations:
Will physical infrastructure (e.g., storage, roads and transport) be 
developed at sufficient speed and scale? Will soft infrastructure 
(information, regulations, transparency) be developed effectively? 
How will the balance between export and import of agricultural 
and/or food commodities evolve as part of a connected system of 
regional and/or international trade?
Will domestic markets function effectively such that supply and 
demand dynamics are responsive? 
How will supply and demand dynamics affect price stability and 
affordability of food and agricultural inputs?
How will subsistence and small-holder farmers integrate with 
markets?
Will opportunities for value-addition and agro-processing be 
realized? 
How will markets facilitate or limit fair prices for farmers, and the 
dissemination of new technologies and improved practices? 
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16 https://africap.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Malawi-Scenarios-Policy-Brief-July-2019.pdf; https://africap.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/South-Africa-Scenarios-Policy-Brief-July-2019.pdf ; https://africap.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Tanzania-Scenarios-Policy-Brief-July-2019.pdf;  https://africap.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/
Zambia-Scenarios-Policy-Brief-July-2019.pdf. 17 See extensive review in https://IPCC.ch/SRCCL
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What will the role of the private sector be, who will investors be 
(urban elite/international citizens), and what will they invest in 
(production, processing, trade)?
Thus, the scenarios for the future include a future where market 
integration was high (good access to markets for small and larger 
scale farmers, access to markets locally, regionally and further 
internationally, and where markets functioned well: transmitting price 
signals smoothly, with little volatility, and market competition allowed 
fair pricing). The converse scenario of low market access and poor 
functionality was where there was little access to markets, markets 
supplied goods in a volatile way (with prices fluctuating for producers 
and consumers), and sometimes failing—especially in the event of 
climate disruption, leading to food and income insecurity.
Land tenure reform (little or no change to extensive 
land reform)
Whilst formal land reform was particularly a focus in South Africa, the 
issue of land tenure and its governance was discussed in multiple 
countries as an issue. Some of the key questions raised included:
How will land use, natural resource degradation, water scarcity be 
governed and managed and how will this be influenced by land 
tenure? 
How will “common land”, “community land” and “state land” be 
governed and will governance be efficient and adequate to avoid 
land grabs?
What implications will land acquisitions and changes in tenure 
have for poverty and food access amongst the most marginalized?
How will land reform be achieved? 
How does the uncertainty around land reform affect and limit near-
term financial investment?
How will any land reform affect investors, jobs and economies in 
agriculture, the resilience of the agricultural sector, and trade?
Will land reform lead to reduced farm size and scale, and will it 
affect competitiveness in the local and national economy?
Will land reform restrict or enhance exports? 
What will the rol of the priva e sector be, who will investors be 
(urban elite/international citizens), and what will they i vest in 
(pr duction, processing, trade)?
Thu , the scena ios for th future include a futur  where market 
integration was high (good access to markets for small and larger 
scal  farmers, access to markets locally, regio ally and further 
internationally, and where markets functioned well: tra smitting price 
signals smoothly, with little vol tility, nd market competition allowed 
fair pricing). The converse scenario of low mark t access and poor 
function lity was where there was little access to markets, markets 
supplied goods in a vol tile way (with pri es fluctuating for producers 
and con umers), and sometimes failing—especially in the event of 
climate disruption, leading to food and income insecurity.
La d tenure reform (little or o chang  to 
extensive land reform)
Whilst formal land reform was p ticularly a focus in South Africa, the 
issue of land te ure and its governance was discussed in multiple 
countries a  an issue. Som of the key questions raise  included:
How will land use, natural resource degradation, water scarcity be 
governed d managed and how will this b  influenced by land 
tenure? 
How will “common land”, “commu ity land” and “state land” be 
governed and will governance b  efficient and dequ te to avoid 
l nd grabs?
What implications will land acquisitions and cha g s in tenure 
have fo  poverty and food access amongst the ost marginalized?
How will land reform b  achieved? 
How does the uncertainty around land reform ffect and limit near-
term financial investment?
How will any land reform aff c  investors, jobs and economies in 
ag iculture, th  resilienc of the ag icultural sector, and trade?
Will land reform lea  to reduced farm size and scale, and will it 
affect competitiveness in the local and national economy?
Will land reform restrict or enhance exports? 
How will politics influence land reform implementation? 
How will land reform affect food security?
For the purposes of the scenarios, the discussion focussed on there 
being little or no change from today at one end of the axis, and 
significant land reform at the opposite end. This includes security of 
tenure for smallholder farmers, good governance of communal lands 
(avoiding land-grabbing from high income countries or multinational 
corporations, sustainable land management to avoid land degradation, 
etc.) and, in the case of South Africa a redistribution of land to create 
greater equity. Little or no land reform will maintain “business-as-usual” 
drivers of productivity and sustainability. 
Land reform has the potential to change these; increasing equity 
and security of tenure, and enhancing incentives for sustainable land 
management (through security of investment arising from tenure). 
On the other hand, significant land reform can have downside risks 
in increasing food insecurity in smallholders and reducing overall 
productivity through downscaling intensive, larger enterprises (as 
occurred in Zimbabwe (Mudau et al. 2018; Ramutsindela and Hartnack 
2019)).
Access to technology (as current to high)
The issues considered as important in the sample countries included 
the following key questions: 
To what extent will new innovations in agricultural production be 
adopted and transform production? Will technologies help farmers 
adapt to and/or mitigate climate change? 
Who will be in a position to access and benefit from technological 
developments?
Will food regulation and trade be harmonized? 
What degree of political voice will be afforded to stakeholders from 
across food value chains, both nationally and internationally? 
How will new and emerging technologies shape agriculture and 
food? Will regional alliances be strengthened, allowing wider 
technology adoption? 
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What will be the impacts of future technologies? Will they be 
affordable and accessible? 
Will farmers want to adopt them? 
Will information, training and extension services be appropriate 
and sufficient? 
How will technologies affect farm size and agricultural 
employment?
These issues translate into a scenarios axis by imagining futures 
defined by today’s conditions continued into the future on the one 
hand, and a different future where there was significant support for 
the rollout, adoption and use of new technologies, harmonised in 
standards applicable in countries of production and consumption, 
particularly across the region, to support regionalised supply chains. 
Such a future will only be underpinned if technologies are also socially 
licensed through citizens’ 
(a) desire to consume products produced in new ways (such as 
produced using genetically modified techniques); and 
(b) acceptance of the social impacts created (e.g., widespread 
uptake of advanced technologies has implications for employment 
rates). Given the range of social and regulatory constraints to 
adoption, development of new technologies is necessary but not 
sufficient for their uptake at scale.
Policy and its alignment (poor policy, not aligned 
across siloes, weakly implemented to integrated 
policy, aligned across policy domains and well 
implemented).  
The final scenario axis selected by the participatory process pertains 
to the development and implementation of government policies. In 
particular, whether policies are developed but implemented badly 
(e.g., not assessed and monitored) or whether there is material policy 
mis-alignment (e.g., trade policy not supporting agricultural policy, 
or agricultural policy not aligned with infrastructure policy). This is 
perhaps most relevant to the area of food systems which impinge on 
a range of policy areas: agriculture, environment, health and nutrition, 
food security, trade, employment and climate change, for example.
The issues considered important in the focal countries included: 
How can “whole of government approaches” be developed given that policymakers tend to be siloed within ministerial teams with little cross-
government visibility?
How best to build capacity so policymakers understand other areas?
How can policy development and its implementation be better integrated? Particularly when implementation may be the responsibility of sub-
national regional offices.
How can standards (e.g., on agriculture) be harmonised across complex, multi-country supply chains?
Are “system approaches” to policy too complex to implement?
Plausible extremes articulated on this continuum include, at one end, poorly co-ordinated and aligned policy, which is enacted but not monitored, 
so that actors face conflicting goals (e.g., people without access to nutritious food being incentivised to produce tobacco for an export market; 
agricultural incentives being put in place without farmer training; support for production of commodity crops without investment in market 
infrastructure; competition for land being enhanced through different policy areas not being minimised and managed; environmental policy 
undermining food security policy, and vice versa). 
Conversely, at the other end of the scale, a plausible alternative may involve cross-government coordination of policies such that multiple goals are 
aligned; these are coupled with investment in implementation and monitoring, and there are sufficient incentives to stimulate uptake. 
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Summary of scenarios 
from the SADC 
region: drivers, trends 
and uncertainties
Additional insights on future uncertainties in 
the Southern African region comes from a 
recent synthesis of scenarios for the region. 
This study of recent scenario work relevant 
for building climate-resilient livelihoods 
in the SADC region was conducted 
as part of a joint initiative of the SADC 
Secretariat’s Food, Agriculture and Natural 
Resources (FANR) Directorate, the Centre 
for Coordination of Agricultural Research 
and Development for Southern Africa 
(CCARDESA), the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI), through the CGIAR 
Research Program on Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) 
and the German Development Cooperation 
funded by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ).
The study summarized the drivers and 
uncertainties associated with a set of 41 
scenarios at global, sub-Saharan African, 
Southern African and country levels of 
analysis. The table on the right gives a 
sample of the mega-trends and drivers 
identified at the SADC regional level, which 
have also been covered in the mega-trend 
analysis in the previous section. Some 
specific examples of the uncertainties that 
arose in the scenario development process 
are noted for each of these in the table.





Over 2010–17, EAC, SADC and SACU 
were the only regional economic 
communities with intraregional trade 
above 10%. SADC intraregional trade was 
19% of the region’s world trade in 2008 
and rose to a peak of 22% in 2016 before 
falling to 20.4% in 2017.
Political and economic crises in 
member countries generating conflict 
and inability to cooperate within 
region. 
Dominant role of South Africa in SADC 
and bi-lateral agreements they make 






Agreements in place, implementation 
weak.




Services dominate the region’s economy, 
largely due to the influence of South 
Africa, on average contributing about 
60% to GDP from 2010 to 2017, followed 
by mining and quarrying at 14.4% and 
manufacturing at 11%.
Can the region successfully grow 




Capacity/willingness to implement 




Imports increasing despite expansion in 
domestic production.
Investments in domestic food 
production and value chains.
Greater integration of SADC food 
trade.
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The mega-trends that have, over recent decades, shaped the world 
into the one we know today are changing (e.g., power shifting from 
West to East, the multilateral cooperative world driving increasing 
globalisation coming under strain from competition between states 
and inequality). In addition, the growing fragility of the globalised 
world means disruptions are becoming more common: COVID-19, 
agricultural pests and diseases, climate shocks and migration of 
people. Together, “events” and changing trends all lead to greater 
instability and uncertainty about the future. What has happened 
in the last decade or so suggests that, compared to our views at 
the turn of the century, the world of the future is less likely to be a 
predictable extrapolation of the past.
The discussion on mega-trends and their associated uncertainties 
illustrates the potential for a range of plausible futures, some of 
which have been explored using scenarios. These futures will be 
shaped by events—like COVID-19, as well as drivers, some of 
which we know and can predict, but also some of which we know 
but they are not currently predictable. This latter category includes 
climate risks, access to markets and technology, structural changes 
around the access to and tenure of land, and more sophisticated 
policy frameworks tackling challenges systemically. 
There is a range of alternative, 
plausible futures that suggests 
three key questions for today’s 
decision makers:
If business-as-usual is not an option: what will 
the future look like?
Given that the emerging drivers of the global and regional 
economies differ from the past, and yet the future is 
increasingly uncertain, how is it best to think about 
designing today’s policies? Decisions made today, based 
on looking-backwards, may become less fit for purpose 
as the future diverges from the past. Whilst scenarios 
are not a means of predicting the future, thinking about 
alternative futures within a scenario framing is a route to 
challenging simple extrapolation of the past that may not 
be fit for purpose. 
Conclusions
How will today’s decisions play 
out well if the future changes?
A key question for decision-
makers today is: “What happens if 
today’s policies are geared around 
assumptions about mega-trends 
that turn out to be incorrect?”. For 
example, if investments in building 
climate-resilient livelihoods are based 
on increasing access to international 
markets just as the world is entering a 
phase of “deglobalisation”? Scenario 
exercises help imagine different futures 
to ensure that today’s decisions do 
not lock the system into a pathway 
that is increasingly difficult to achieve. 
They therefore help develop robust, 
future-proofing of decisions given the 
uncertainty of the future.
If “black swan” events are likely to happen, 
will that disrupt us and shift us towards a 
different future?
Today’s economies often seem impossible to change, 
because there is so much invested personal, political and 
financial capital in our current way of running things (as 
well as planning for the future). Lower income countries 
are invested in replicating pathways to development 
that have historically allowed higher-income countries 
to achieve their economic success. However, as 
COVID-19 has shown, “business-as-usual” thinking about 
development can be undermined by events. 
Whilst disruptive events by their nature create acute 
changes, some of which are painful, they also change 
the degree that the system is locked-in to its current 
trajectory. In some circumstances, such events can drive 
structural change sufficient to re-chart the direction of 
travel. Recognition that such events occur, and will occur 
more frequently, reduces the degree that decision-makers 
necessarily are locked-in, or constrained, in believing the 
future is a simple linear development of the past.
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